This paper starts by discussing the process of financial development based on the four fundamental types of frictions (paradigms) to which agents are exposed. Financial development and financial stability are shaped by the efforts of market participants to find the path of least resistance, and the grinding down of frictions through financial innovation and financial participation. This approach leads to broad predictions regarding the sequencing, returns to scale and convexity of the developmental paths that are largely verified based on a battery of financial indicators. The paper then explores possible reasons underlying gaps in financial development. It finds that demand effects (past output growth), financial crashes, and supply effects (the quality of the enabling environment) all play an important role. It also finds that informational frictions are easier to overcome than contractual frictions. Finally, the paper finds that financial development in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) lags substantially as regards some indicators, particularly banking depth and stock market liquidity. LAC's mediocre growth, turbulent financial history, and residual weaknesses in the contractual (rather than informational) environment all seem to have contributed to these gaps. JEL classification codes: G2, G38, O16, O54
Introduction
The academic literature on financial development has mostly focused on two causal links: (i) from the enabling environment to financial development; 2 and (ii) from financial development to economic growth. 3 Strangely enough, prior to the recent global financial crisis, not much had been said either on the interactions between financial structure and financial development, except that function seemed to matter more than form. 4 And there is surprisingly little literature on the financial development process itself. What drives or precedes what? Is financial development a largely predictable, mostly linear process? Is it the same for all countries? Or can some countries leapfrog or get stuck?
Financial development has been typically understood as a relatively smooth and predictable march from -relationship-based finance‖ to -arms-length finance.‖ 5 This basically involved a systematic one-way process of market completion driven by a gradual reduction of agency frictions. Following the insights of Spence, Akerlof and, especially, Stiglitz, 6 one strand of thought has seen financial development as driven by informational improvements that lead to the steady mitigation of asymmetric information failures (such as moral hazard and adverse selection). In the wake of the more recent academic literature that emphasizes enforcement costs (spearheaded by Geanakoplos and Holmstrom and Tirole among others 7 ), the emphasis has been broadened to include problems of limited pledgeability, thereby putting the accent on creditor rights and collateral availability. In all cases, innovation, competition and market discipline have been viewed as the key forces marshalling this steady progress towards market completion.
The global financial crisis imposed a sobering reassessment of many of these views. It showed that the process of financial development has a -dark side‖ that can make it both nonlinear and bumpy. The interface between financial development and financial stability is much more complex than was generally believed. What may appear as progress can in fact exacerbate market failures, thereby undermining financial sustainability. Collective failures become increasingly important as financial systems mature. Yet these failures, unlike agency failures, cannot be addressed through market discipline. This paper aims at partially filling the mentioned gap in the literature while addressing some dimensions of the conventional view on financial development that the recent global crisis has brought into question. The paper has a triple objective. First, it aims at shedding light on the process of financial development from the perspective of the finance paradigms that are set out and discussed in De la Ize (2010 and . The sequence and shape of financial development reflects the intensity and mix of four fundamental frictions (one for each of the four finance paradigms, namely, asymmetric information, costly enforcement, collective action, and collective cognition) to which agents are exposed and that raise the risks and costs of financial transacting. Finance pierces through the path of least resistance, which depends on the stage of development, the effectiveness of public policy, and the forces of competition, innovation and regulatory (or tax) arbitrage. But we also point out that financial development has a dark side, as reducing the frictions associated with one paradigm can exacerbate the failures associated with the same paradigm or with another paradigm. Thus, financial development can of itself lead to financial instability. In particular, resolving the frictions that limit participation in the good times can lead to creeping collective action failures when agents withdraw in the bad times. Or by promoting short-term, repo-based wholesale lending, the easing of information frictions can exacerbate exposure to free riding and other collective action failures.
The second objective of this chapter is to anchor this conceptual discussion as much as possible on empirical observations. While the theoretical discussion is fairly abstract by nature, it does lead to a few empirically verifiable predictions. First, the gradual easing of finance frictions provides some broad sequencing pointers. The easing of collective action frictions through increased participation, interconnectedness and network effects naturally gives rise to increasing returns, allowing for broad predictions of convexity and critical mass effects in the path of development of certain financial services or features of the financial system. At the same time, demand effects (differential growth rates), supply effects (for example, the trickle down of financial innovation) or financial crashes (for example the lasting impact of a credit collapse) raise the possibility that the financially undeveloped countries of today may follow a quite different path from that followed by the similarly undeveloped countries of yesterday. Financial innovation, in particular, can often be readily transferred to emerging financial systems, allowing them to leap frog to the level of advanced systems for certain financial services (e.g., credit cards on the basis of scoring technologies), even if contractual institutions and property rights systems continue to significantly lag behind. Financial development may thus involve multiple paths, particularly for those financial transactions where efficiency gains are likely to be stronger.
We use a battery of indicators of financial markets and institutions to explore such issues. A comprehensive set of structural controls, including per capita income, and the size, density and age distribution of a country's population, is used to create a uniform benchmark that facilitates comparisons across countries. We find that the sequencing of financial services broadly conforms to what one would expect based on the gradual grinding down of financial frictions. For example, reflecting agency problems, credit to governments emerges before credit to private participants, bank deposits precede bank credit, and the development of capital markets and associated institutions, such as mutual funds, follows that of banking. At the same time, reflecting collective action frictions and network effects, external funding precedes domestic funding, wholesale (non-deposit) funding takes off very strongly but only after some threshold is reached, the development of capital markets is highly convex and shows large returns to scale effects, and interconnectedness and globalization explode as financial systems mature.
We then explore possible reasons underlying gaps in financial development relative to the benchmark. We decompose under-performance into demand, supply and crash components using as additional controls a battery of policy variables, output growth (a proxy for demand), various enabling environment indicators (supply side variables), and a crash variable. We find that financial crashes, rather than financial volatility per se, can account for large and lasting lags in financial development, particularly as regards private credit depth and bank margins. Demand effects, as proxied by past output growth, can also account for substantial cross-country differentials in financial depth. Enabling environment factors such as enforcement costs, and creditor or property rights also play an important role, albeit on average somewhat more limited than stability or demand effects. This analysis also leads to useful insights as regards the order and relative ease with which frictions are overcome. In particular, we find that information frictions appear early but are easier to overcome than contractual frictions. While the former are mostly technological, the latter mostly reflect collective action frictions that are trickier to resolve.
We then focus on Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). By benchmarking the LAC region against other regions or groups of countries, we are able to assess its developmental performance, a third key objective of this chapter. We first assess whether LAC lags and, if so, with regard to which financial development indicators. We find that, whether we include all countries or only the largest seven, LAC is broadly on track (when controlled for its level of economic development and other exogenous structural factors) as regards many indicators but lags substantially as regards others. In particular, basic banking depth indicators (deposits and private credit) lag substantially and the gap has worsened, rather than improved. In contrast, bank efficiency, albeit strongly lagging in the past, has mostly caught up. As regards capital markets development, LAC is approximately on track as regards the size of its stock or bond markets, but lags substantially as regards the liquidity of its domestic stock market, with the gap only getting worse overtime.
Using the decomposition between demand, supply and crash variables developed for the sample as a whole, we then explore the reasons underlying LAC's gaps in financial development. We find a particularly striking match between LAC's turbulent financial history and its current developmental troubles. With the notable exception of Chile, large credit bubbles and crashes have affected all of its largest countries in the last twenty years. Financial sustainability is therefore absolutely essential for LAC to catch up. The region will thus need to find the right extent and proper shades of prudential oversight, tight enough to control the forces of the dark side, yet not so tight that it inhibits innovation and competition. The challenge will be heightened by the bubbly current global environment and the fact that the maturing financial systems of the region are increasingly likely to become exposed to the innovation-induced collective failures that have recently devastated the most advanced financial systems in the world.
We also find that LAC's mediocre growth can explain an additional sizable share of its apparent development gaps in finance. Finally, we find that contractual gaps, particularly enforcement and creditor rights, rather than informational gaps, also have contributed significantly to the development gaps. Hence, further progress in improving the judiciary and the legal framework appear to be called for.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 deals with the analytics of financial development; the bright side first, then the dark side. Section 3 discusses the empirics of financial development; it starts with a brief review of data and methods, and then discusses issues of sequencing, path convexity and unicity, and sustainability. Section 4 explores the possible policy and institutional reasons underlying financial development gaps. Section 5 benchmarks LAC against other regions. Section 6 concludes by underlining some of the caveats and limitations of our empirical analysis and flagging key policy issues and challenges looking forward.
2.
The Analytics of Financial Development
a. The bright side
Financial development is all about the gradual grinding down of the frictions that hinder financial contracting. If we lived in a frictionless Arrow-Debreu world of complete markets, risks would be fully and efficiently internalized in the price system; suppliers of funds or insurance would deal directly in the market with the users of funds or insurance; and neither of them would have a use for financial service providers. Instead, frictions make markets and the ability to contract incomplete and imperfect, thereby opening a wide scope for the financial system to add value to society.
There are two basic classes of frictions that hinder financial transactions-agency frictions and collective frictions. In turn, each class can be sub-divided into two categories, one that relates to informational frictions (and this includes agents' limited capacity to process and understand information as much as their capacity to obtain it), and the other that relates to what we can loosely define as relational frictions, agents' capacity to agree and act upon collectively beneficial financial arrangements and to enforce bilateral contracts (Table 1) . Thus, this simple dichotomy underpins four paradigms, two of which-asymmetric information (AI) and costly enforcement (CE)-are associated with agency frictions, and the other two-collective action (CA) and collective cognition (CC)-with collective frictions. 8 Asymmetric informational frictions limit the scope for financial contracting because they induce a misalignment of incentives between the principal and the agent-the agent can use his informational advantage to act in ways that are not in the interest of the principal. 9 This, in turn, can lead to the commonly known market failures of adverse selection, moral hazard and shirking, and false reporting. Enforcement frictions, on the other hand, limit the scope for contracting because they limit pledgeability. 10 As one party has difficulties in credibly committing to repay, financial contracts are effectively limited to those that can be effectively collateralized.
Collective frictions, on the other hand, hinder FD because they constrain participation. Much of the gains from financial activity relate to the reduction in transaction costs and the increase in liquidity and risk diversification benefits that result from multilateral arrangements in which many agents participate. Such arrangements can of course materialize through markets where bilateral transactions can be conducted around a simple trading platform, or financial institutions (a bank, an insurance company, a mutual fund) that offer services whose benefits are pooled across a large number of customers. The larger the number of participants, the larger the benefits of participation. However, participation is hindered by informational frictions-one does not participate in an activity one does not comprehend well-as well as collective action frictions, which typically condition the setting up and operation of multilateral arrangements.
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Individuals involved in financial contracting search for ways to cope with-and limit the costs and risks deriving from-these frictions and failures. Individuals engage in six basic types of financial activity (responses). 12 The first three reflect efforts aimed at lessening the frictions themselves by:
Acquiring information or investing in learning; this smoothes out the cognitive frictions of the AI or CC paradigms; (ii)
Acquiring and using collateral; this directly deals with the frictions in the CE paradigm; and, because collateral also allows for information-blind transacting (no need to know your borrower if you have good collateral), it also helps resolve the frictions at the heart the AI paradigm; and, (iii)
Delegating transacting to specialized intermediaries; this reduces all frictions through division of labor, and economies of scale and scope.
In addition to engaging in direct friction-reducing efforts, individuals also respond to the frictions and associated failures by limiting their risk exposure. They can do so by:
Diversifying and pooling; this limits risk exposure through statistical means; (ii)
Buying insurance and hedges; this allows for risk sharing and spreading; and, (iii) Staying liquid; this allows individuals to stay away from risk or maintain an option to exit from it quickly when needed.
Through public policy, governments facilitate private players' responses. They aim at both facilitating bilateral transactions and steering them in ways that are socially more desirable, doing so in a variety of ways that translate into progressively higher levels of engagement; they can: Lessen agency or collective failures by directly providing financial services (thereby assuming a public agency role) through the use of general public infrastructure or the creation of specialized public financial institutions.
Different components of the financial system help deal with frictions in different ways.
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Consider for example the need for information. Capital markets provide price signals and motivate the supply of hard, public information by borrowing firms. Banks fill the information gap by generating proprietary information; fund managers through the monitoring of marketable assets; and market facilitators (auditors, rating agencies, and credit bureaus) through the sale of specialized information and analysis. As another example, take the need for risk reduction through diversification. Capital markets allow investors to buy assets with different risk profiles. Banks, insurance companies, and asset managers do so through pooling. Finally, take the need for liquidity. Capital markets provide liquidity by allowing participants to unwind assets at limited cost. Banks offer deposits that can be redeemed on demand and at par.
Financial structure is thus a snapshot, at given point in time, of the actual constellation of financial services aimed at coping with frictions.
14 Financial development can in turn be seen as the evolution of financial structure over time and proceeds by stages. 15 An early resolution of collective action frictions (including through the introduction of central banks) allows for basic payment and custody services. A steady march from -relationship-based finance‖ to -armslength finance‖ ensues from then onward. 16 At lower stages of FD, financial markets resolve agency frictions by relying on non-tradable and immovable collateral and connections, i.e., on relationship-based transactions. As the informational and contractual environment improves, 13 Thus, financial structure reflects the underlying frictions and paradigms at work. Tables 2 and 3 present simple typologies that help illustrate these linkages. 14 The shape and nature of financial structure is given by the mix (i.e., relative weights and composition) and degree of sophistication of markets and products (debt, equity, derivatives), leveraged intermediaries (commercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, dealers), non-leveraged asset managers (brokers, mutual funds, pension funds), and facilitators (accounting & auditing firms, rating agencies, investment consultants, mortgage originators, etc.). 15 Table 4 presents a synthetic view of the phase of financial development (early, intermediate, mature) at which various financial activities are likely to emerge. 16 A lucid discussion of this process is in Rajan and Zingales (2003) .
private information becomes public and other types of collateral become available and tradable, allowing FD to gradually escape from the tyranny of connections. Similarly, as information becomes more abundant and governance arrangements improve, monitoring costs come down and monitoring can increasingly rely on third parties (rating agencies, market analysts, investment advisors, external auditors), statistical methods (scoring systems, value-at-risk calculations), and accounting and disclosure standards.
The gradual easing of agency frictions help boosts participation. In turn, by unleashing positive network and scale externalities, the benefits of participation (liquidity, efficiency) become self-reinforcing. 17 Thus, in the more mature phase of FD, there is a quantum jump in participation as more clients, players, and transactions make markets increasingly deep, dense and interconnected. The rising participation also allows financial institutions and capital markets to increasingly complement each other. The whole process is quickened by financial innovation, a major driver of FD that reflects and channels the forces of competition, deregulation, and regulatory and tax arbitrage, as well as theoretical or operational breakthroughs.
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The gradual easing of finance frictions depicted above provides broad pointers about the order in which various financial activities are likely to emerge, and the shape of the paths they are likely to follow once they emerge. The order of appearance of financial activities should reflect the intensity of the frictions to which they are exposed. The activities that are the least prone to (agency or collective action) frictions should emerge and develop first. On the other hand, for those activities that are inhibited mainly by collective action frictions, once a critical mass is reached and they start to develop, rising participation should trigger increasingly important positive network externalities that further boost their development. We would thus expect those activities to be also the ones that have the most explosive (convex) development paths.
Since activities that exhibit the highest returns to scale should generally be the ones exposed to the highest collective frictions, scale effects should correlate with the order in which financial activities appear and the shape (convexity or concavity) of their development path. Of course, deviations from these basic patterns may occur in response to specific policy choices or market demands, or linkages between different the development of various activities and 17 Figure 3 presents a schematic view of the links between financial structure, financial innovation and financial participation. 18 Indeed, the history of FD is marked by major waves of innovation. Consider, for instance, the role in the exponential ascent of finance in the Western World stemming from the invention of Italian banking (based on traderelated bills of exchange) by the Medicci in the late XIV century in Italy; or the introduction of checking accountsbased payment systems, fractional reserve banking, and central during the XVII; or the development of the government bond market, its seeds already visible in the late middle ages; or the invention of the joint-stock, limited liability company in the early XVII century and the associated mushrooming or stock exchanges; or the emergence of marine insurance and life insurance in the second half of the XVII century; or, in the later part of the XX century, the development of securitization and derivative products. For an insightful rendition of the history of finance in the Western World, see Ferguson (2008) . A recently updated review of the roots and dynamics of financial innovation is Lerner and Tufano (2011) . On the role of competition and deregulation in FD, see Rajan and Zingales (20003) . Examples of theoretical and methodological breakthroughs that have dramatically influenced financial development include double-entry book keeping, probability theory, life expectancy tables and actuarial science, and the BlackScholes option theory.
instruments. Although the time period for which data is available is rather short, these patterns can be broadly verified through an econometric analysis, as shown below.
b. The dark side
However, before shifting to empirics, let us briefly explore the dark side of financial developmental. There are two types of finance maladies (i.e., failures to complete markets and achieve fully efficient equilibria). The first one refers to failures to reduce the basic frictions that hinder financial development. This may reflect an inability to fully resolve agency frictions or collective (participation) frictions. The former (agency frictions and failures) continues of course to dominate the literature on financial development and accounts for most of the policy debate. The problems may occur at the level of the investor, reflecting his inability or lack of interest in monitoring (in either case an expression of bounded rationality), at the level of the borrower (reflecting problems of governance), or somewhere in between (reflecting problems of incentives and skin in the game at some level of the monitoring pyramid). The latter (participation frictions and failures) are of course a routine occurrence in the less developed financial systems and justify much of the state's catalytic and financial infrastructure building role. However, participation failures may happen even in well-developed systems, particularly in relation to the spreading of risk.
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The second type of finance malady, however, does not come from the financial system's incapacity to reduce frictions. Instead, it is the apparently successful financial development ensuing from a reduction of agency and participation frictions-a process that is boosted by innovation-that itself leads to problems of stability and sustainability, even in the absence of government-induced social moral hazard. Financial development takes place but often in an unsustainable (fragile or even self-destructive) mode that is in conflict with financial stabilitythis is what we define as the -dark side of finance‖.
The dark side has three basic modes. In the first mode, the successful easing of agency frictions is, paradoxically, at the source of the problem. It can trigger lethal collective action failures, such as negative uninternalized externalities, free riding or catastrophic coordination failures. For example, the availability of public information-and the associated reduction in the ability to appropriate the rents from private information-encourages investors to free ride. Instead of staying put and investing in monitoring, they may rather invest short and exit at the first sign of possible trouble. 21 But the easing of agency frictions can also trigger a second round of agency failures, much as building more highways can exacerbate congestion by increasing traffic. As shown in the global crisis, the rising reliance on third party monitors, coupled with the 19 The pattern can also be broadly corroborated through comparative historical studies. The literature on the history of finance in the Western World is vast. See, for instance, Ferguson (2008) and Rajan and Zingales (2003) . 20 Markets' capacity to spread tail risks finely enough may result in excessive risk concentrations and inefficiently high risk premia. This theme, which goes back to the seminal contribution of Arrow and Lind (1970) , is revisited in Anginer, de la Torre and Ize (2011) . 21 Huang and Ratnovski (2010) show that the dark side of bank wholesale funding dominates when bank assets are more arms-length and tradable. ease of exit, gives rise to a complex and opaque chains of transactions where agents have little or no -skin in the game.‖
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In the second mode, the successful easing of collective action frictions on account of rising participation is, again paradoxically, what triggers the problems. The positive externalities of increased market participation in the good times turn into creeping negative externalities and other collective action failures in the bad times. While market participation is a win-win for all as it enhances depth and illiquidity, market withdrawal in times of stress may be individually optimal but socially harmful as it originates fire sale spirals and self-fulfilling liquidity losses.
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In either case, problems arise from significant wedges between private and social costs and benefits, which markets on their own are simply unable to handle. Instead, the financial activities individuals engage in as self-protection for the good times no longer work under the bad times. Agents do not internalize the adverse social or systemic implications of their individual actions. For example, insuring oneself by selling risk to others (through, say, credit default swaps) can actually raise systemic fragility through interconnected risk and lead to contagion and accentuated downward spirals in bad times, when default risk becomes highly correlated and the value of collateral collapses. Or else rising participation along the intensive dimension (the same intermediaries engaging in more transactions and becoming financial giants) can boost social moral hazard by vastly increasing the social costs of individual failures through the too-big-to-fail or too-interconnected-to-fail syndromes.
But the dark side still has a third mode in which the successful reduction of agency or participation frictions leads to problems of collective cognition (i.e., the CC paradigm at work). The associated financial development process can feeds collective mood of optimism that puts the system on a disequilibrium path. This is often dramatically amplified by the far-reaching effects of a financial innovation (e.g., securitization) that unleashes a bout of exhuberance, even if the full implications of the innovation are not well understood. The mood swings first accentuate the boom; once euphoria turns into despair, they worsen the collapse. 
3.
The empirics of financial development
a. Data and methodology
We now proceed to conduct a simple empirical analysis of aggregate financial indicators. Our aim is to illustrate the above conceptual framework by showing that the order of appearance of various financial activities and the path they follow as they develop validate, at least broadly, 22 See Aschcraft and Schuerman (2008) , and Gorton and Metrick (2010) . 23 See Shleifer and Vishny (2011) . 24 The importance of mood swings for financial bubbles and panics finds its roots in Keynes' animal spirits and Hyman Minsky's writings on financial crises (see Minsky, 1975) . More recently, it was popularized by Kindleberger (1996) and Shiller (2006) . the linkages and dynamics described in the previous section. We measure domestic financial development based on a battery of thirteen depth indicators that include: 25  Key components of commercial banks' operations (deposit and non-deposit funding, credit to the private sector, claims on other domestic financial institutions);  Insurance companies premia (life and non life);  Mutual funds and pension funds assets;  Public and private debt securities (domestic and external capitalization);  Equity (domestic capitalization).
We complement these depth indicators with the proportion of bank fee-based income-a more -qualitative‖ additional indicator of banking development-and a couple of indicators of efficiency and liquidity for which there is sufficient cross-country data:
 Banks' net interest margin;  Equity market turnover.
To reflect cross-borders finance, we use four financial globalization indicators:
 Gross country external debt (claims and liabilities);  Gross country external equity (claims and liabilities).
Finally, we complete this battery of financial development indicators with four bank soundness indicators:
 Leverage (the unweighted capital to assets ratio);  Capital adequacy (the risk-weighted capital to assets ratio);  Profitability (returns on assets);  Liquidity (the share of liquid assets into total bank assets).
To make the data as comparable as possible across countries, we control for economic development (based on the level and square of GDP per capita) as well as various other factors that can be considered to be policy exogenous (at least in the short-term) including: 26 population (size, density, young and old dependency ratios) and country-specific characteristics (fuel exporter, offshore financial center, transition country).
To better capture the underlying financial development patterns, we employ quantile (median) regressions, which are less influenced by outliers. Moreover, rather than undergoing a panel estimate, which would blend variations across countries and across time, we conduct our analysis in two stages. In the first stage, we take the medians for each country of its financial 25 The data are from FinStats 2009, a world-wide financial database put together by the World Bank, which covers 40 key financial indicators for the period 1980-2008 (coverage quality varies between variables). The data come from a variety of sources including IFS, BIS, WDI, S&P, Bankscope, Axco, and national sources. 26 The controls were selected iteratively, based on individual statistical significance and collective explanatory power.
indicators over the whole sample period and then conduct a cross-section estimate over the medians. In a second stage, we compare this cross-section aggregate development path with the individual, dynamic development paths followed by specific country groupings, grouped by initial income levels and by geographic regions.
b. Patterns
The results on three key patterns-order of appearance, convexity, and returns to scaleare displayed in Figure 4 , where activities are ordered by the per capita income level at which they appear. 27 Financial activities that are the least prone to frictions emerge and develop first. Activities that are subject to strong frictions require more time. Some activities (such as debt and equity securities markets) are strongly boosted by to scale and network effects, which give rise to convexity in the shape of the paths after some threshold level of friction reduction is reached. The main stylized patterns are discussed in what follows. (Figure 5 ), as governments are the first to overcome elementary frictions. Government borrowing takes place initially abroad and in foreign currency, given the smallness of financial markets at low levels of economic development.
Government borrowing. It emerges early in the game
28 External public debt declines as per capita income rises and is replaced by domestic debt. Notably, domestic markets for government debt appear also at an early stage even though they face large returns to scale (implying a large size threshold and significant collective action frictions). This suggests that governments are willing to pay a premium arguably not just to meet their financing needs but also because a government debt market is a public good that helps conduct monetary policy or develop other financial markets. Domestic public debt follows an S-shaped path, reflecting solvency constraints that eventually limit the size of public debt in relation to GDP.
Banking services. They come next (Figure 6 ). Retail funding (bank deposits) emerges before credit. Bank deposit services initially expand with early need for simple custodial and payment services. Banks have a harder time lending than attracting funds. As private credit moves from relationship-based lending to arms-length finance, it rises along a convex path-it catches up with deposits over time and eventually exceeds retail funding as wholesale (nondeposit) funding makes up for the slack. Lending to other financial institutions follows private credit and is highly convex. These features are all related. As frictions ease up, retail investors are increasingly able to shift into higher yielding market instruments or to have their funds managed by asset managers or institutional investors rather than banks. At the same time, banks 27 The level of GDP per capita at which financial services start to appear is measured by the intercept of the crosssection paths with the horizontal axis. To limit lower tail distortions when a non-linear fit is imposed on the data we only use for these estimates a linear per capita GDP term. Convexity is measured by the coefficient of quadratic per-capita GDP when financial indicators are regressed against both per-capita GDP and its square. Scale effects are measured by the coefficient of population size in the controlled regressions. 28 This is of course the basic premise of the original sin literature, which focuses on the inability of emerging economy sovereigns and corporates to issue long-term domestic currency-denominated debt. For the relevant analysis and suggestions for -redemption‖ see, for example, Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) ; Calvo and Reinhart (2002); Eichengreen and Hausmann (2002); and Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2005) . The fact that the better foreign institutional framework facilitates enforcement is an important component of the -original sin‖ story (see de la Torre and Schmukler, 2004) . increasingly lend to each other. 29 The high convexity of these activities reflects the reduction of collective action frictions associated with rising participation (more players and same players engaging in more activity) and denser finance.
Capital markets. They come after banking. Private debt securities follow equity. The late appearance of capital markets and the strong convexity of their development paths are of course clear manifestations of the complexity of agency and collective action frictions. Notably, private debt markets emerge late in the game despite limited returns to scale, suggesting that, unlike in the case of public debt whose growth is primarily constrained by critical mass effects, information and enforcement frictions (rather than returns to scale-collective action frictions) are the key binding constraint. The fact that corporate bonds develop after stocks is arguably because growing firms can initially substitute bank debt for market debt but will need at some point to issue stocks no matter what.
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Institutional investors. They appear at very different stages of the FD process. Pension funds emerge early, mutual funds late; insurance arises somewhere in between but non-life emerges earlier than life. That pension funds appear early in the data reflects the key role played by recent pension reforms. Mutual funds appear late despite not facing increasing returns to scale (i.e., not being constrained by market size) because the availability of marketable assets is a precondition for their development. The later appearance of life over non-life insurance is in part because the latter is influenced by policy-e.g., mandatory insurance for motor vehicles-while the former is dependent on the development of capital markets and hence more subjected to collective action frictions. 31 Reflecting the need to invest in marketable assets and for life cohorts to interact inter-generationally, life insurance takes more time to bloom; moreover, once it does, it follows a steeply convex path.
Before closing this section, an important additional feature of development paths is worth emphasizing. The counterpart of convex development paths (for example, that of private credit to GDP) is that their impact on real development (GDP growth) must necessarily exhibit decreasing returns. Unless the rate of income growth keeps accelerating as the level of income rises (a clear dynamic impossibility), the impact of finance on growth should necessarily level off at some point. This is exactly the conclusion that several recent papers reach when regressing output growth against financial depth indicators.
32 While in itself this does not 29 The high convexity of wholesale funding and interbank lending can be viewed as the growth analog of the rapid rise of wholesale funding and bank interconnectedness. See Shin (2010) . 30 The fact that equity markets have an unlimited upside may also contribute to explain their earlier appearance even under high agency frictions. 31 The abnormally low (negative) returns to scale of casualty insurance reflect the predominance of foreign trade insurance in the small open economies. It accounts for a disproportionally high share of total casualty insurance, reflecting the importance of foreign trade for these economies. See Feyen, Lester and Rocha (2011) . 32 Deidda and Fattouh (2002) find that FD has a positive but statistically insignificant impact on growth in countries with low level of economic development and a positive and statistically significant impact on growth in countries with higher levels of economic development. Rioja and Valev (2004) find that there is no statistically significant relationship between finance and growth at low levels of FD, that there is a strong positive relationship at intermediate levels of FD, and that there is a weaker but still positive effect at higher levels of FD. Arcand, Berkes and Panizza (2011) find that finance actually starts having a negative effect on output growth when credit to the private sector exceeds 110 percent of GDP. This result is congenial to that in De necessarily imply that there might be something as -too much finance‖ (if one reasonably assumes non-satiation, more finance should always be better), in combination with the dark side of finance, it does raise the issue of whether at some point the marginal benefits of financial development may not become smaller than the marginal costs of maintaining financial stability (more on this below).
c. The paths
Development paths are unlikely to be unique, i.e., the lower-income countries of today are unlikely to exactly retrace the path followed yesterday by the higher-income countries. There are a number of reasons why this might be the case. A first, obvious but still worth noting, reason is country-specific policies. A second reason is path dependence, which results from the fact that output growth is itself a function of financial development. Thus, because today's financial development depends on today's output, which in turn depends on yesterday's financial development, initial conditions matter. 33 Thus, FD trajectories can vary from country to country in regard of financial services that rely heavily on local institutions that are not tradable across borders. A third reason is leapfrogging. It is most likely to result from financial innovations that are transferable across borders; therefore, it affects those financial services that do not rely too heavily on (non-tradable) local institutions.
34 A fourth reason is financial crashes. A fifth and final reason is endogenous quantum jumps in FD at the higher end of the income scale.
To unscramble these effects we separate countries into four groups according to their initial per capita income (low, lower middle, higher middle, high) and plot the year-by-year medians for each of the groups, together with the underlying cross-section path obtained by averaging data over the whole period for which it is available. Given that incomes grow over time, they provide the general direction of movement. Hence, the year-by-year medians provide a reasonable proxy for the underlying dynamic paths. 35 The results-which are summarized in Figure 7 for thirteen financial depth indicators, in Figure 8 for four financial globalization indicators, in Figure 10 for two efficiency/liquidity indicators, and in Figure 11 for our qualitative bank development indicator-show the following key features: 1) With a few exceptions (public debt and non-life insurance), the dynamic paths followed by all financial depth indicators in the higher income countries cross the cross-section paths from below, suggesting quantum jumps in financial development at the higher end of the income scale. Similar features appear for financial globalization and the equity market turnover. Such an -explosion‖ of financial activity suggests that, once countries Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) , who found that in high income countries FD was positively correlated with output growth during 1960-1985 but that the correlation was negative in the 1970-85 subperiod. 33 Thus, institutional rules and arrangements become self-reinforcing (North, 1990) . 34 Consider, for example, the cases of credit card services and e-banking. These services are now found in most developing countries and, while they cover a smaller fraction of the adult population, they work with comparable functionality and quality as in rich countries. In both cases, developing countries have been able to leapfrog because the associated technology is relatively easy to import and adapt, and the services do not heavily depend on local contractual institutions. 35 The correlation between time and per-capita income for the world as a whole is 0.82. Except for the early eighties and the early nineties, per-capita income grew smoothly during the rest of the sample period.
reach some stage of economic and financial development, interconnectedness and network effects become so high as to -ignite‖ a secondary chain-reaction of financial activity, both inside and across countries. 2) However, for several depth indicators, including bank deposits, life insurance premia, pension fund assets and domestic public debt, the dynamic paths followed by the lower income countries also cross the cross-section paths from below, suggesting the presence of leap frogging effects. Leap frogging is also detectable for the equity market turnover at the lowest end of the income scale, as well as for banking margins for all income levels except at the top. In the case of pension funds and domestic debt, such leap frogging is likely to be mostly policy-induced. However, for bank deposits and bank margins it is likely to reflect the diffusion of technological innovations. In the case of bank margins, innovations affect all countries across the income scale, except those at the top where the already narrow margins limit the scope for further gains.
3) Some indicators, notably private credit and wholesale funding, exhibit clear cyclical paths of booms and busts, suggesting that for these countries financial development was hardly a smooth process (more on this below). Should those countries not have been hit by such crises, it is apparent from the stark, V-shaped recovery of private credit after the bust (crossing the cross-section path at a sharp angle) that both sides of their banking intermediation (deposits as well as credit) would have similarly benefitted from innovation-induced leap frogging.
4) The cross-section path for the ratio of fee income to interest income is U-shaped, suggesting that early banks as well as mature banks rely less on intermediation. For the former, it is because they cannot lend, for the latter because competition with capital markets and other intermediaries (reflecting the overcoming of both agency and collective action frictions in mature financial systems) induces them to rely increasingly on fees from market services rather than on interest income from traditional intermediation.
What Explains the Financial Development Successes and Gaps?

a. The policy variables
How can financial development successes and gaps relative to benchmark be explained? Is it due to demand effects, supply effects, or the lasting impact of past financial turbulence? To address these issues, we add policy controls to the regressions of financial development indicators (FDIs) and test the impact of credit crashes on financial development. More specifically:
 On the demand side, we add past output growth, as a proxy for the investment-related demand for loanable funds and equity (i.e., the supply of -bankable‖ projects).  For financial turbulence, we define mild, strong and severe credit crashes as annual drops in private credit to GDP of 5 to 10 percent, 11to 20 percent and over 20 percent, respectively. 41 To eliminate the effect of recurrent volatility, we also include in the regressions the standard deviation of normalized private credit.
In all cases, we first filter these policy variables (effectively we also -benchmark‖ them) using the same set of controls as for FDIs. We then include the residuals as additional controls to explain financial development. Table 5 , which reports the results of the EEI benchmarking, provides revealing insights on how the underlying frictions that affect the development process are themselves affected by financial development (i.e., on the nature of the feedback loop process between financial development and financial frictions pictured in Figure 3 ):  The quality of the informational environment (as proxied by credit information) is concave but subject to scale effects.
b. Results
 In contrast, the quality of the contractual environment (creditor and property rights) is convex but not subject to scale effects.
This suggests that informational frictions are of a mostly technological nature. Because of fixed costs, they are easier to implement in larger countries. However they are solvable with adequate investments and ready-made imports from abroad. Moreover, once the required investments are in place, there are decreasing returns to further informational improvements as developmental levels rise. In contrast, contractual frictions cannot be solved by technological investments or imports. They are mostly institutional and reflect collective action frictions that are trickier to resolve, no matter how large the country. And the pay-offs from better institutions continue to rise with the level of economic development. 41 We depart from most of the crisis literature by studying multiple annual credit crashes instead of focusing on a -before and after analysis‖ based on financial crisis periods. All three crash variables are defined as the percentage of years a country experienced a given type of crash. We average all data for 2005-07 and add each crash variable separately to the regressions of private credit to GDP. Table 6 reports the results of adding the policy controls to the FDI regressions, using the subset of financial indicators over which these variables were found to have the most significant impacts. Results can be summarized as follows:
 Enforcement costs affect bank credit, bank wholesale funding and the equity market turnover. The strong impact on banking is consistent with the presumption that collateral (hence the capacity to enforce) is vital to banking. The impact on the equity turnover may reflect the fact that better enforcement generally coincides with better corporate governance.
 Credit information appears to be more of a mixed bag. It does not have much of an impact on banking but instead has a strong impact on the equity market turnover. While caveats of course apply (the lack of significance may simply reflect the limited quality of the indicator), this mixed result could suggest that while relationship lending and the use of collateral can remedy for informational problems in banking, informational frictions are more difficult to circumvent in the case of capital markets.
 Legal and property rights strongly affect the equities market but do not seem to have much impact on banking depth; however, they enhance the profitability, solvency and liquidity of banks. The importance of contractual rights for the development of the equities market is obvious (contractual rights are also likely to be strongly correlated with governance). The fact that they also indirectly affect banking is somewhat more puzzling but broadly plausible: a better rule of law may promote the capitalization of banks by enhancing their profitability.
 Past GDP growth strongly promotes bank credit while reducing the liquidity of bank assets. This confirms that demand effects have a first-order impact on banking depth indicators. The negative impact on liquidity is of course fully consistent with the positive impact on credit.
 Credit crashes have a strong impact on banking depth (primarily credit but also funding), as well as on banks' margins; they also have some negative impact on stock trading. That credit crashes induce banks to contract intermediation and raise their margins is of course hardly surprising. What is more remarkable, however, is that banks take a long time to recover from a crash. 42 It is also quite telling that it is credit crashes-but not volatility per se-that leave a substantial and lasting imprint on financial development. Remarkably, we also find that the probability of crashes increases as private credit -over-performs‖ over its benchmark (Table 7) . This is a noteworthy reminder that financial development and financial stability interact in complex ways, reflecting the ever-present duality between the bright side and the dark side.
 The fact that credit crashes and demand effects have such a strong impact on private credit while, once benchmarked (i.e., after accounting for endogeneities), supply side constraints only appear to have a more moderate impact is important to inform the policy trade-off debate between stability and development. While finance can certainly be improved through financial reforms, it ends up being highly dependent on high but sustainable economic growth. Good economic policies and sound prudential management are essential to financial development.
Benchmarking LAC
a. Where is LAC?
We now benchmark LAC using regional (rather than initial income) groups. We first assess LAC's current position relative to benchmark using the residuals of the workhorse regression model, comparing the nineties to the two thousands, and contrasting LAC7 (the seven largest financial systems in the area) with the region as a whole (Table 8) . We then assess LAC's progress over time and compare its performance to that of the G7, other high income countries, 43 a subset of Eastern European countries, 44 and a subset of Asian countries. 45 As in the case of the initial income groupings presented in the previous section, we isolate dynamic from crosssectional variations by calculating the medians by regions and showing the resulting year-byyear changes against changes in income, together with the underlying cross-section development path.
Starting with banking (Table 8 and Figure 12 ), we find that:  LAC's banking intermediation (both deposits and private credit) lags very substantially its cross-section benchmarks (by over 20 percentage points of GDP in the case of the LAC7 countries), with the lag worsening over time rather than improving.
 The lag in banking intermediation appears to be largely rooted in past financial turbulence. Unlike other regions of the world, particularly the high-income and Asian countries that have experienced dramatic but presumably sustainable take-offs, LAC went through a huge bubble. Private credit rose in the late eighties and early nineties but peaked in the mid-nineties and collapsed thereafter. Bank deposits followed a rather similar pattern, albeit less accentuated. As illustrated in Figure 13 based on individual country data, all major countries in the region went through sharp credit booms and busts. After overtaking deposits during the booms (an excess demand for loanable funds), credit fell deeply below deposits during the busts (an excess supply of funds). Except for Chile, which was blessed enough not to undergo a repeat of its early banking crisis, all other major countries in the region managed to cram down two such major crisis episodes over a thirty years interval.
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 When credit is decomposed into its commercial, mortgage and personal components, the lags appear to be mostly concentrated in commercial and mortgage lending. Instead, the very rapid expansion of personal lending over the last decade, particularly in the LAC7 countries, has made up for most of the gap (Figure 14) .
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 LAC banks have also underperformed as regards efficiency (net interest margins). However, the lag has in this case been closing steeply rather than growing.
 LAC banks largely exceed their benchmark as regards key prudential buffers (solvency and liquidity ratios). Indeed, LAC currently has the highest reported prudential buffers in the world.
As regards capital market indicators (Table 8 and Figure 15 ), we find that:
 Albeit somewhat on the low side, particularly for the LAC7 countries, LAC is broadly on track with respect to the capitalization of its equities and private securities.
 In contrast, the liquidity of its equity market, as proxied by turnover, is lagging substantially and the lag has been steadily worsening.
As regards institutional investors (Table 8 and Figure 16 ), we find that:
 LAC is on track as regards pension funds.
 However, LAC lags as regards mutual funds and insurance.
b. Why is LAC lagging?
LAC's underperformance as regards the depth of its bank lending and the liquidity of its equity market is all the more troubling since these two indicators are precisely the ones that have been found in the finance and growth literature to be the most closely associated with future output growth.
48 How can such stark under performance be explained? Table 9 provides a synoptic view based on the same econometric approach as that used in Section III above. Highlights are as follows: 46 Notice however that some of these credit cycles were the result of extreme price and interest rate volatility associated with failed stabilization attempts that gave rise to unsustainable build ups of financial claims during periods of price freezes, followed by abrupt meltdowns (of both bank assets and liabilities) once prices were allowed to adjust. Such episodes appear to have also left a durable imprint on financial intermediation, not because they eroded banks' capital or relaxed market discipline, but instead because they undermined depositors' confidence in banks or the local currency. 47 Due to the limited coverage of the data currently available on the breakdown of private credit we were unable to perform meaningful controls. Hence, we only present the raw data. 48 See Beck and Levine (2004) .  LAC's informational environment over-performs while its contractual environment under-performs. This suggests that, despite substantial progress over the last two decades, important roadblocks remain as regards the rule of law and the strength of institutions.
 LAC's turbulent financial history accounts for the largest explained share of the banking gaps: 6 percentage points in private credit to GDP, and 4 percentage points in bank deposits and wholesale funding. The imprint of past turbulence is particularly large in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Peru (Table 10) .
 Past turbulence also largely contributes to explain banks' still high interest margins, high capital and liquidity buffers, and high profitability.
 Financial turbulence also explains a sizable chunk (13 percentage points), albeit by no means all, of the underperformance in equity turnover. This suggests that the effects of past financial turbulence are multifaceted and complex, in part perhaps because they are likely to be associated with broad economic turbulence.
 The output growth gap and the underperformance of the contractual enabling environment indicators-enforcement costs, creditor rights and property rights-explain about 3 percentage points each of credit underperformance.
 Altogether, the explained component of the private credit and equity turnover gaps cover only about half of the total gaps (12 percentage points out of 25 for private credit and 16 out of 35 for the equity turnover). This suggests that additional factors may be at play, or else that the indicators used to assess the gaps are noisy or prone to measurement errors.
6.
Final Thoughts
This paper started from the premise that both the evolution of financial structure (financial development) and its sustainability (financial stability) are shaped by four fundamental types of frictions and their associated market failures and paradigms. Two such frictions restrict agents' capacity to establish and enforce bilateral contracts (agency frictions) and the other two restrict agents' capacity to participate and coordinate their financial activities in ways that are collectively desirable (collective frictions). The broad predictions derived from this approach regarding the order of appearance, returns to scale and shape of developmental paths of various financial activities turned out to be generally satisfied. In particular, where activities are mostly hindered by participation frictions, development paths should exhibit substantial convexities, as rising participation and interconnectedness generate positive externalities that promote further participation and interconnectedness. Thus, much of financial development may be explosive.
The obvious counterpart of such explosiveness, however, is that the impact of financial development (measured for example as private credit to GDP) on real development (output growth) must necessarily exhibit decreasing returns. Unless the rate of income growth keeps accelerating as the level of income rises (a clear dynamic impossibility), the impact of finance on growth should necessarily level off at some point. Indeed, this is exactly the conclusion that several recent papers reach when regressing output growth against financial depth indicators. 49 In this sense, finance resembles a luxury good; its use explodes as income rises, yet its benefits (whether in welfare or growth) should naturally exhibit falling marginal returns. By itself, this does not necessarily imply that there can be -too much finance‖. If one reasonably assumes nonsatiation, more finance should always be better.
However, the same frictions that feed the developmental forces of the bright side also feed the forces of instability from the dark side, making them interact in complex and unexpected ways. If collective action failures become more problematic in denser and more interconnected financial systems, the dark side of finance may well increase in intensity as income rises. Even if the intensity remained constant, instead of rising, the declining marginal benefits of financial development should eventually fall below the (rising or constant) marginal costs of financial instability. If so, the conclusion that finance will at some point become excessive would become inescapable. But the balance between the marginal costs and marginal benefits of finance will ultimately depend on the quality (and cost) of the policy response, as better policies could simultaneously limit the risks (and costs) of financial instability. This puts an increasing premium on keeping the forces of the dark side in check as financial development deepens. For the LAC region, the other main focus of this paper, this puts emphasis on the need to maintain in the years ahead a properly integrated mix of developmental policies and prudential oversight. 
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